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ABSTRACT
Prevailing wage laws, which require that construction workers employed by private
contractors on public projects be paid at least the wages and benefits that are "prevailing" for similar
work in or near the locality in which the project is located, have been the focus of an extensive policy
debate. We find that the relative wages of construction workers decline slightly after the repeal of a
state prevailing wage law.  However, the small overall impact of law repeal masks substantial
differences in outcomes for different groups of construction employees.  Repeal is associated with
a sizeable reduction in the union wage premium and a significant narrowing of the black/nonblack
wage differential for construction workers. 
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       Introduction
Prevailing wage laws, which require that construction workers employed by private
contractors on public projects be paid at least the wages and benefits that are “prevailing” for
similar work in or near the locality in which the project is located, have been the focus of an
extensive policy debate.  Early empirical research on this topic sought to estimate the direct
financial costs of prevailing wage laws to governments.  To the extent that the prevailing wage is
above the market wage, the laws may impose financial costs both through increased wage bills for
construction projects (e.g., Gujarati 1967; GAO 1979; Bourdon and Levitt 1980; Goldfarb and
Morrall 1981; Fraundorf et al. 1982, Thieblot 1996), and through an inefficient mix of capital and
labor and of different types of workers (e.g., CBO 1982).  
However, because public construction accounts for between one-fifth and one-quarter of
all construction, and because prevailing wage laws cover a substantial number of private projects
undertaken with public financing or assistance (e.g., CBO 1982, U.S. Department of Commerce
1996), prevailing wage laws may also affect construction labor markets more broadly.  These
broad effects of the laws may have public policy implications beyond those implied by the direct
financial costs of the laws to government.  If governments are the marginal purchasers of
construction services, then laws that require governments to pay a supramarket wage on all
projects may aid unions by reducing the potential cost advantage of nonunion labor.  Furthermore,
if worker training or safety is undersupplied from a social perspective by competitive construction
markets, then prevailing wage laws may provide incentives for optimal training and safety (Philips
et al. 1995).   On the other hand, prevailing wage laws may aggravate discrimination against
blacks in the construction industry by reducing nonunion-worker competition with members of
historically-discriminatory trade unions.  Bernstein (1993, 1994) has argued that the federalprevailing wage law, the Davis-Bacon Act, was passed with discriminatory intent (but see Belman
and Philips (1996) for an opposing view), and Keyes (1982) finds that Davis-Bacon contributes to
the low percentage of skilled black construction workers.  
Despite this policy importance, there is little evidence on the extent of the effects of
prevailing wage laws on construction labor markets.  Identifying the impact of the Davis-Bacon
Act on construction costs is difficult because its national scope and long history mean that there
are no suitable construction labor markets to serve as a “control” group not subject to the Act. 
Thus, this paper investigates the impact of the repeal of state prevailing wage laws  -- which
specify that state governments must pay prevailing wages on state- and locally-financed
construction -- from 1970-1993 on labor markets for construction workers.  It employs a
modified difference-in-difference-in-difference approach to estimating the impact of the laws,
estimating the effect of law repeal as the change over time in labor market outcomes for blue-
collar construction versus nonconstruction workers from states that repealed their laws to the
change over time in outcomes for workers from states that did not.  We also assess the extent to
which law repeal has differential effects across groups of construction workers: on union versus
nonunion, and black versus nonblack workers.
The paper proceeds in four sections.  Section I provides background on prevailing wage
legislation and discusses the existing empirical literature.  Section II describes the state law
repeals that we evaluate and presents our data and econometric models.  Section III presents our
results, and Section IV concludes.
I. Background on Prevailing Wage Laws
Prevailing wage laws exist at the federal, state, and local level.  The federal prevailingwage law, the Davis-Bacon Act, was passed in 1931.
1  The current Act, modified by amendments
in 1935 and 1964, requires private contractors to pay workers the prevailing wage/benefit
package on all contracts of more than $2,000 for construction, alteration, or repair of federal
public buildings or public works.  The “prevailing wage” referenced in the Act is defined by the
Secretary of Labor as the package of wages and benefits paid to the majority of workers in a
given occupation grouping in the geographic area of the project; if the majority of workers do not
earn the same wage/benefit package, then the prevailing wage is equal to the average wage/benefit
package paid to these workers.
2  The “public projects” covered by the Act include all construction
purchased directly by the federal government, plus most private but federally financed or assisted
construction: the terms of the Act cover construction undertaken through more than 58 other
laws (CBO 1982).  
State prevailing wage laws set a minimum wage for construction workers on state (and
generally municipal) works projects.  Their terms differ across states in multiple dimensions, and
are frequently defined customarily rather than by reference to written statutes or regulations
(Thieblot 1986, 1995).  Some state prevailing wage laws are almost nonbinding; others set wages
for virtually all contracts at the collectively-bargained wage level.  In addition, different states’
laws treat jointly financed projects (e.g., state/federal, local/federal, private/public) differently. 
Some states defer to the federal Act; others preempt the federal Act; others set the state
prevailing wage at the higher of the state or federal prevailing wage.  The scope of projects and
workers covered under state laws also varies.  States explicitly include or exclude specific types of
projects (such as road construction) and/or workers, and/or projects above or below a given
value. 
Even if state prevailing wage laws covered purely state and local public construction only,they would have a potentially significant influence on construction labor markets.  State and local
public construction accounts for 16 to 22 percent of all construction over the 1970-1993 period,
as compared to 2 to 3 percent for federal public construction (US Department of Commerce
1996, Current Construction Reports C30, Tables 1-2).  However, the federal prevailing wage law
is likely to affect labor markets disproportionately, because state and local construction projects
are often partially federally funded.  (Indeed, even though federal public construction is only 2-3
percent of total construction, CBO estimates suggest that 20 to 25 percent of all construction is
covered by the Davis-Bacon Act (CBO 1982).)
The early empirical literature was concerned with assessing the impact of the Davis-Bacon
Act on the federal government's construction costs (e.g., Gujarati 1967; GAO 1979; Bourdon and
Levitt 1980; Goldfarb and Morrall 1981; Fraundorf et al. 1982).  These studies estimate the
impact of Davis-Bacon as the difference between the Department of Labor's posted Davis-Bacon
prevailing wage and the average wage for construction workers of a given occupation in a given
geographic area.  Although the studies agree that Davis-Bacon increases the government's labor
costs for construction, they report a wide range of point estimates (from 4 to 38 percent).
However, identifying the impact of the Davis-Bacon Act on construction costs is difficult
because its national scope and long history mean that there are no suitable construction labor
markets to serve as a “control” group not subject to the Act.  In particular, because the average
wage in an area is a function of the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage, the difference between the
Davis-Bacon wage and the average wage is not an unbiased estimate of the additional labor costs
borne by the government, over what they would have paid in the absence of Davis-Bacon (but see
Allen (1983) for a novel way to correct for this bias).   Most seriously, though, this identification
problem limits the generalizability of the findings from the early literature to construction labormarkets more broadly, and thereby limits the extent to which the early literature can illuminate the
policy questions of interest.
In recognition of these gaps, and of the size of the share of state and local public
construction, more recent work investigates the impact of state prevailing wage laws, by
comparing labor market outcomes across states with differing laws.  Building on prior research
(Thieblot 1986, 1996; Philips et al. 1995), Table 1 presents the effective dates for the adoption
and repeal of state prevailing wage laws.  As of 1969, forty states had prevailing wage laws that
covered construction financed by state and local governments.  Between 1969 and 1993, nine
states repealed their prevailing wage laws, and Minnesota enacted a prevailing wage law.  As
discussed above, because of the multidimensional variation across states in the prevailing wage
statutes and regulatory policies, there is no way a priori to categorize the laws more finely.
Conclusions from the state prevailing wage law studies are not as uniform as results from
analyses of the effects of Davis-Bacon.  Allen and Reich (1980) report that state prevailing wage
laws have no significant effect on school construction costs, holding constant price levels,
urbanization, and climate variables, although Allen (1987) suggests that prevailing wage laws
enable union contractors to receive a higher price for similar school and hospital projects than can
nonunion contractors.  Philips et al. (1995) find that the average construction wage declined more
in states that repealed their prevailing wage laws than in states that did not, based on 4-digit SIC
average wages.  They also find that repeal of state prevailing wage laws is associated with an
increase in injury rates for plumbers and pipe fitters, although Thieblot (1996) shows that average
construction injury rates in repeal states declined by more than average rates in nonrepeal states.
However, concerns about unobserved differences across states and over time complicate
interpretation of the estimated effect of interest from all of the state law studies.   The studies failto control for fixed differences across states in laws, regulatory policies, and other characteristics; 
for state/time-varying macroeconomic factors affecting all blue-collar labor markets; and for
state/time-varying microeconomic factors such as the occupational and skill mix of construction
workers.  For example, if states that repeal their prevailing wage laws also have unobserved fixed
differences in policies that lead to lower construction wages, then the estimated effect of the laws
might represent in part unobserved fixed differences across states, leading to the overstatement of
the impact of prevailing wage law repeal.  Along these lines, if states repeal prevailing wage laws
in response to weak blue-collar labor markets (to improve competitiveness), then the estimated
absolute effect of the laws on construction workers might represent in part the effect of
unmeasured labor market conditions for all blue-collar workers.  Either of these biases would be
magnified if contractors respond to repeals by employing less-skilled workers, because the
estimated effects might represent in part unobserved changes in workforce composition.   And, in
any event, the existing work does not address other policy questions of interest, such as the
differential impact of prevailing wage laws on black and union workers.
II. Models and Data
We investigate the impact of state prevailing wage law repeal with methods that directly
address these concerns.  Our basic specification compares time trends in blue-collar construction
and nonconstruction labor market outcomes across repeal and nonrepeal states during a 24 year
period.  We model wages and unionization rates as nonparametric functions of worker
characteristics, state-fixed-effects, time-fixed-effects, and prevailing wage laws; thus, we control
for fixed differences across states and over time.  We use individual data on workers from the
census and Current Population Survey (CPS), which enable us to control for changes inworkforce composition.  Finally, we estimate the impact of prevailing wage law repeal as the
difference between the change over time in the relative blue-collar construction/nonconstruction
wage in repeal states and nonrepeal states, to control for other, unobserved time-varying factors
that affect all blue-collar labor markets and may be correlated with the status of labor market
regulation.
While this is fundamentally a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach to
estimating the impact of the laws, we modify conventional DDD strategies in several ways.  First,
our models include few restrictive parametric or distributional assumptions about the relationship
between laws, individual characteristics, and labor market outcomes.  Second, we do not only
model the impact of law repeal as having a one-time effect on the levels of outcomes.  For
example, to the extent that multi-year contracts influence construction wages, changes in
prevailing wage laws may not have instantaneous effects on labor markets.  In addition, to the
extent that prevailing wage laws affect the bargaining positions of workers and employers, the
laws may affect future wage growth as well as current wage levels.  Third, in order to investigate
the impact of repeal on black and on union workers, we use a difference-in-difference-in-
difference-in-difference (DDDD) approach to estimate the relative growth in the blue-collar
black/nonblack (union/nonunion) construction/nonconstruction wage differential in repeal versus
nonrepeal states.
To illustrate DDD estimation of the impact of law repeal, Table 2 presents descriptive
statistics from both individual- and establishment-level data sets on wage trends during the 1980s
for construction and nonconstruction workers, for states repealing and not repealing prevailing
wage laws.
3  In addition to analysis of the census and CPS, Table 2 reports for comparison
purposes descriptive statistics from the Department of Labor’s ES-202 data gathered byestablishment on employees covered by various unemployment insurance programs.  The “before
law repeal” columns (1) and (4) present average wages for 1979 (1979 CPS and ES-202, 1980
census); the “after law repeal” columns (2) and (5) present average wages for 1993 (CPS and ES-
202) and 1989 (1990 census).  The “time difference for location” columns (5) and (6) present the
proportional change in wages before versus after law repeal in a given type of state.
The top panel of Table 2 compares the change in average wages for construction workers
in the states that repealed their laws (“expermental” states) to the change in average wages for
construction workers in the states that did not (“nonexperimental” states).  In the census, for
example, there was a 17.5 percent fall in construction workers’ wages over the 1980s in states
that repealed their laws, compared to a 12.9 percent fall in wages in states that did not.  Thus,
there was a 4.7 percent relative fall in construction workers’ wages in states that repealed their
prevailing wage laws; this is the differences-in-differences (DD) estimate of the impact of law
repeal.  
However, if there were unobserved time-varying factors that affected all blue-collar labor
markets and were correlated with the status of labor market regulation, this DD estimate would
not identify the impact of the law: the DD estimate would be a combination of the impact of the
law and of the impact of the unobserved factors affecting all blue-collar labor markets.  The
bottom panel of Table 2 investigates this possibility by examining the change in average wages for
nonconstruction workers in experimental relative to nonexperimental states.  In fact, in the
census, there is a slight fall in relative wages in experimental states of 2.2 percent, which suggests
that controlling for factors correlated with law repeal that influence all blue-collar workers may be
important.  
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that there is a 2.5 percent fall in the relative wages of construction workers in states that repealed
their prevailing wage laws, compared to the change in relative wages in the nonexperimental
states.  This DDD estimate suggests that prevailing wage law repeal has a causal impact on
construction labor markets.  This conclusion is supported by replication of this result with other
data sets, collected for different types of workers.   Simple DDD estimates from the CPS and ES-
202 are similar, at -1.3 percent for blue-collar workers in the CPS (= -0.020 + 0.007), -1.9
percent for all workers in the CPS (= -0.016 - 0.003), and -1.8 percent for all workers in the ES-
202 (= -0.041 + 0.023).
Our formal models analyze repeated cross sections of blue-collar workers from the 1970,
1980, and 1990 census and the 1977-1993 CPS.  In state s = 1, ..., S during year t = 1 , ..., T, one
observation in our model is an individual worker i = 1, ..., Nst.   Each worker has occupational and
demographic characteristics Xist, which we describe as a set of binary variables.  We describe
worker i's industry of employment with Cist, where Cist = 1 if worker i was employed in
construction in state s and year t and 0 otherwise.  Depending on the year of the survey and the
worker's state of residence, the worker's labor market outcome may be affected by a prevailing
wage law.  We define Ls = 1 if state s repealed its prevailing wage law over the 1970-1990 period
(Ls = 0 otherwise), and Ast = 1 if the repeal occurred before year t (Ast = 0 otherwise).
4  We study
two labor market outcomes:  real hourly wages Wist and union status Uist, where Uist = 1 if worker
i was a union member and 0 otherwise.
In regression terms, the basic DDD models of wages and unionization rates are of the
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where èt is a time-fixed-effect, ás is a state-fixed-effect, åist is an error term,
5 and ã2 is the effect of
interest -- the change over time in the construction wage premium in states that repealed their
prevailing wage laws relative to the change over time in states that did not.
We use the CPS to investigate the dynamic impacts of prevailing wage law repeal by
estimating separately the change over time soon after repeal and long after repeal in the
construction wage premium in states that repealed their prevailing wage laws relative to the
change over time in states that did not, where
In one time-since-adoption specification, we defined SAst = 1 if the repeal occurred 1-2 years
before year t (SAst = 0 otherwise), and LAst = 1 if the repeal occurred 3 or more years before year
t (LAst = 0 otherwise).  In an alternative time-since-adoption specification, we defined SAst = 1 if
the repeal occurred 1-4 years before year t (SAst = 0 otherwise), and LAst = 1 if the repeal
occurred 5 or more years before year t (LAst = 0 otherwise). 
Finally, we estimate DDDD models to assess the impact of prevailing wage law repeal on
the change over time in differences by race and union status in the construction wage premium
(ã4):
We estimate the effect of law repeal on trends in differences in the construction wage premium
soon after versus long after repeal with versions of equation (2) analogous to equation (1a). 
Analogues to equation (2) that substitute Uist for Bist assess the impact of law repeal on the change
over time in differences by union status in the construction wage premium.We estimate the parameters of models (1) and (2) with nonfarm private-sector blue-collar
wage and salary workers aged 16 to 64 using the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
census.  Our principal CPS results are based on the currently employed workers in the Merged
Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORGs) for 1979-1993 plus such workers in the May CPS survey
groups from 1977-1978; we appended the earlier May CPS samples to the CPS MORGs to
expand the time period covered by our analysis in the years before law changes occurred.
6  For
the same reason, our CPS results estimating the impact of repeal on the relative union wage
premium for construction workers (equation (2)) are based on the 1983-1993 MORGs matched
with May CPS survey groups from 1977-1981 (because the CPS did not begin asking all outgoing
rotation groups about their union status until 1983, and the CPS did not ask any workers about
their union status in 1982).
7  The vector of control variables X in the CPS includes indicators for
age (16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 60-64), educational
attainment (less than high school, high school, some college, college graduate or more), marital
status (married or unmarried), gender, black or nonblack race, and one-digit occupational
classification (craftmen and kindred workers, operatives except transport, transport equipment
operatives, nonfarm laborers, service workers), plus an interaction effect between each element of
X and an variable indicating whether the observation was from the 1986 CPS or later.
Our census results are based on workers employed at any time during the previous year
from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 public use census files.  Thus, the wage information in the three
censuses pertains to the years 1969, 1979, and 1989.  To calculate the hourly wage for workers in
1970 with missing hours, we imputed average hours per week based on reported hours per week
for workers in 1980 with the same age, sex, race, ethnicity, marital status, educational attainment,
industry, and occupation.  For all years, we analyze a 1 percent sample of blue-collarnonconstruction workers.  For 1980 and 1990, we analyze a 5 percent sample of blue-collar
construction workers; for 1970, a 5 percent sample with state information is not available, so we
analyze a 2 percent sample of blue-collar construction workers (U.S. Department of Commerce
1972).  Because Minnesota enacted a prevailing wage law in 1973, we omit workers from
Minnesota from our analysis of the census data.  The vector of control variables X in the census
includes all of the variables from the CPS analysis plus indicators for hispanic/nonhispanic
ethnicity and foreign/US country of birth, plus interactions between year indicators and each




Table 3 presents estimates of ã2, the effect of prevailing wage law repeal on construction
wage differentials.  In contrast to the simple DDD estimates from Table 2, our regression
estimates of the impact of law repeal control for changes in workforce demographic and
occupational composition across states and over time (except column (1)), for time- and state-
fixed-effects, and for construction*time- and construction*state-fixed-effects (except columns (2)
and (4), which control for construction*time and construction*Ls).  In addition, our regression
estimates allow returns-to-characteristics to differ in 1970, 1980, and 1990 (census) and to differ
before and on/after 1986 (CPS).  Columns (1)-(3) provide estimates based on the 1970, 1980, and
1990 census (column (1) reports DDD estimates on the effect of repeal on the change over time in
wage levels from equation (1) without controls for demographic and occupational characteristics
Xist).   Columns (4)-(7) provide estimates based on the 1977-1993 CPS: columns (4) and (5)report estimates from equation (1), and columns (6) and (7) report estimates of the time-since-
adoption specification given by equation (1a).  
The regression results reported in Table 3 echo the simple DDD estimates reported in
Table 2: repeal of prevailing wage laws leads to slight decreases in construction wage
differentials.  In the census, the DDD impact of repeal on the change over time in wage levels
ranges from 2 to 4 percent, depending on the controls included in the regression.
8  Average effect
estimates of the impact of law repeal from the CPS are of the same or smaller magnitude as those
from the census.  The estimated impact of repeal from equation (1) calculated controlling for
construction*Ls (column (4)) is -3.9 percent.  Controlling for a full set of construction*state-
fixed-effects reduces this estimate substantially in both the basic and the time-since-adoption
specification (columns (5) - (7)), suggesting that state heterogeneity in construction labor markets
is an important determinant of wage schedules.
Differential Impacts of Prevailing Wage Law Repeal by Race
However, estimates of the average effect of law repeal fail to identify the differential
effects of repeal across groups of construction workers, which also may be important from a
policy perspective.  We began by analyzing the effects of law repeal on racial differences in
construction employment.  In the 1990 census, blacks comprised 11.7 percent of blue-collar
nonconstruction workers and 7.4 percent of blue-collar construction workers, leading to a black
construction employment differential of -4.3 percentage points (= 0.074 - 0.117).  In the census,
we found that the black construction employment differential shrunk by 1 percentage point in
repeal versus nonrepeal states over our sample period, controlling for demographic and
occupational characteristics (allowing returns-to-characteristics to vary over time), and for state-fixed-effects, time-fixed-effects, time-fixed-effects*black, and Ls*black.  However, the statistical
significance of this result was not robust to the inclusion of a full set of state*black interactions,
and we did not find any significant trends in blacks’ construction employment differentials in the
CPS.
For this reason, we focus on the relative wage impacts of repeal.  Table 4 reports DDDD
estimates of  ã4, the impact of repeal on racial differences in the construction wage premium from
equations (2) and (2a) using the census and the CPS.  Except for column (1), the models in the
Table control for demographic and occupational characteristics (allowing returns-to-
characteristics to vary over time), and for state-fixed-effects, time-fixed-effects, state-fixed-
effects*construction, time-fixed-effects*construction, time-fixed-effects*black, state-fixed-
effects*black, time-fixed-effects*black*construction, and state-fixed-effects*black*construction.  
The results in Table 4 show that repeals affect black and nonblack construction workers
differently.  Columns (1) and (2) show that in the census, the construction wage premium earned
by black workers rose by approximately 4 percentage points relative to that earned by nonblacks
as a result of prevailing wage law repeal; this difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent
level.  According to the CPS, law repeal led to statistically significant increases (at the 10 percent
level) in the long-run relative construction wage premium for blacks of 5.5 to 6.8 percentage
points, depending on specification (columns (3) - (5)).  In both the census and the CPS, repeal has
a negative effect on nonblacks’ construction wage premium, although this effect is only
statistically significant in the census.  
The differential impact of law repeal on blacks’ construction wage premium has two
important implications.  First, because the raw difference between blacks’ and nonblacks’
construction wage premium is 6.5 percentage points,
9 law repeal eliminates at least two-thirds ofthis difference (. 4 / 6.5).  Second, in no specification does law repeal significantly reduce the
absolute level of black workers’ construction wage differential, and in some specifications
positively increases black workers’ construction wage differential, even as it reduces the
construction differential for nonblack workers.  In terms of equation (2), the impact of law repeal
on the absolute level of black workers’ construction wage differential is equal to ã3 + ã4.    In the
census, ã3 + ã4 is small in magnitude, but in the CPS, the long-run estimate of ã3 + ã4 from column
(5) is approximately equal to 4.8 percent. 
Differential Impact of Prevailing Wage Law Repeal by Union Status
Based on the CPS, Table 5 presents estimates of the effect of law repeal on the
construction unionization differential (equations (1) and (1a), columns (1) - (3)) and the relative
union wage premium for construction workers (equations (2) and (2a), columns (4)- (6)). 
Regression results suggest that repeal in the long run reduces the relative construction
unionization differential slightly, although this result is not statistically significant, and is extremely
small in magnitude (and actually positive in sign in the short run).  However, prevailing wage law
repeal does significantly reduce the relative union wage premium for construction workers,
controlling for worker demographic and occupational characteristics (allowing returns-to-
characteristics to vary over time), and for state-fixed-effects, time-fixed-effects, state-fixed-
effects*construction, time-fixed-effects*construction, time-fixed-effects*union, state-fixed-
effects*union, time-fixed-effects*union*construction, and state-fixed-effects*union*construction. 
The first row of column (4) suggests that prevailing wage law repeal reduces the relative union
wage premium paid to construction workers by approximately 5.9 percentage points. Columns (5)
and (6) show that this effect grows in magnitude over time: three years after law repeal, therelative union wage premium paid to construction workers falls by approximately 9.9 percentage
points, growing to 11.2 percentage points after 5 or more years.
10  These effects are both
statistically and economically significant.  Estimates from the 1983-1993 CPS MORGs indicate
that the additional average union wage differential earned by construction workers over that
earned by nonconstruction workers is approximately 20 percent.  Thus, law repeal reduces the
relative union wage differential for construction workers by approximately half.   However, law
repeal in the long run is not statistically significantly negatively correlated with nonconstruction
union wage differentials.  Indeed, states repealing their prevailing wage laws show statistically
significant increases in nonconstruction unionization.  Thus, there is no evidence that prevailing
wage law repeal is correlated with other state-level policies that have adverse effects on unions.
Understanding Differential Impacts by Race and Union Status
We conducted additional analyses to investigate the mechanism by which law repeal
affects racial differences in construction wage differentials, and the construction wage premium
generally.  First, law repeal does not have its most important impact on racial differentials through
its impact on the unionization rate.  Following Ashenfelter (1972), we calculated the total
contribution of  unionization to the black/nonblack wage differential as  
ubjãj - uwjãj’, where ubj  (uwj)  is the share of black (nonblack) workers who are union members in
industry j and ãj (ãj’) is the union/nonunion wage differential for blacks (nonblacks) in industry j. 
In other words, we estimate what the change in the racial wage differential would be if the
unionization rate were zero, relative to the current racial differential.  Since the estimated total 
contribution of unionization to racial differences in the construction wage premium is
approximately 3 percentage points,
11 even a 6 percent decrease in the unionization rate (= 1.5percentage points/25 points total unionization rate, where 1.5 percentage points is approximately
the maximum impact of the law repeals) would reduce the black/nonblack construction wage
differential by at most 0.18 percentage points (=0.06 * 3).   Thus, law repeal, which has an
estimated total effect an order of magnitude larger, must affect wage differentials primarily
through means other than reduced unionization.  
Second, repeal achieves its approximately 2-percent effect on the aggregate construction
wage differential primarily by reducing the union wage premium paid to construction workers.  If
the average construction unionization rate is equal to u, then the average effect for all
construction workers of law repeal in terms of the parameters from equation (2) (substituting Uist
for Bist) is equal to (1-u)*ã3 + u*(ã3 + ã4).  Since u . 0.25 (based on the CPS), ã3 = 0.007 and ã4 =
-0.112 (Table 5, column (6)), most of the effect on the aggregate wage differential comes through
ã4 rather than through ã3.
Sensitivity Analyses
One important concern with any analysis of the effects of law changes is policy
endogeneity – the correlation of law repeal with unobserved time-varying determinants of wages. 
We found no substantial evidence that prevailing wage law repeal was endogenous.  First,
according to Thieblot (1986, 1996), the ways in which repeal occurred are consistent with an
assumption of exogenous timing.  Some repeals (e.g., Arizona) were imposed judicially (rather
than legislatively), and therefore likely to be less dependent on contemporaneous economic
conditions.  Similarly, most legislative repeals (e.g., Alabama, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, New
Hampshire, Utah) only occurred after previous failed attempts; repeal efforts often started years
before a change in law took place.  Second, as discussed above, we found no systematiccorrelations between repeal and wages or union wage differentials of nonconstruction blue collar
workers, suggesting that repeal was not correlated with other state-level policies that have
adverse effects on unions or unionized workers.  
Third, to investigate directly the possibility that time-varying state macroeconomic factors
correlated with but not caused by repeal were responsible for differential trends in wage
differentials, we parameterized the differential impact of state macroeconomic factors by
reestimating equations (1) and (1a) with controls for the state unemployment rate and the state
unemployment rate*construction and by reestimating equations (2) and (2a) with controls for
unemployment, unemployment*black, unemployment*construction, and
unemployment*black*construction (for those versions of equations (2) and (2a) that model the
impact of law repeal on the union/nonunion wage differential, we included controls for
unemployment, unemployment*union, unemployment*construction, and
unemployment*union*construction).  In no case did inclusion of these macroeconomic control
variables alter substantially the estimated effects of law repeal. 
We further investigated the hypothesis that the estimated effects of law repeal were caused
by underlying macroeconomic labor market conditions that differentially affected the construction
industry and were correlated with state labor market rules by reestimating the basic model with
altered control groups.  We estimated equations (1) and (1a) based on the census dropping from
the analysis alternately all individuals from states that always had a prevailing wage law in effect
during the sample period, and all individuals from states that never had a prevailing wage law in
effect during the sample period.  Although the point estimates of the effect of law repeal were
somewhat larger in those models that used only individuals from states who never had a prevailing
wage law as the control group, the substantive conclusions did not change.IV. Conclusion
We find that state prevailing wage laws have small but significant average effects on
construction labor markets.  Repeal of prevailing wage laws leads to slight decreases in the
relative wage levels of construction workers.  However, the effects of repeal differ substantially
across groups of construction workers.  The negative effects of repeal on wages are borne
primarily by union and by white workers.  Although relative construction unionization rates do
not decline significantly in response to repeal, the long-run union wage premium earned by
construction workers decreases by approximately 10 percentage points, or almost half of the total
union wage premium in construction.  Since union members account for approximately 25 percent
of all construction workers, the 10-percentage-point decrease in the union wage premium
accounts for essentially all of the (approximately 2 to 4 percent) decline in construction workers’
wages.
Second, despite the negative overall effects of repeal on construction workers, repeal of
prevailing wage laws does not harm (or actually benefits) black construction workers.  Prevailing
wage law repeal raises black workers’ construction wage differential relative to nonblack
workers’ differential.  Furthermore, in no specification does law repeal significantly reduce the
absolute level of black workers’ construction wage differential, and in some specifications
increases the level of black workers’ construction wage differential, even as it reduces the
construction differential for nonblack workers.
The policy implications of these findings, and their applicability to other states considering
repeal of their prevailing wage laws, depend crucially on the mechanism causing the differential
impact of repeal across groups.  On one hand, the differential impact of repeal may reflect adecrease in discrimination due to a weakening of construction unions, or due to a change in
unions’ behavior arising out of a declining union wage premium.  On the other hand, if repeal
affects workers in heavy construction (SIC 16, e.g., road and sewer construction) more than
workers in light construction (SIC 15 and 17, e.g., general and special trade contractors)
12, and
heavy construction workers are more likely to be white and unionized, then the differential impact
of repeal by race and union status may simply reflect the differential composition of workers in the
two segments of the construction industry.  In this case, law repeal might simply be transferring
resources from workers to purchasers of heavy construction projects.  Furthermore, to the extent
that the composition of the construction industry differs between repeal states and other states
considering repeal, our findings may not even accurately forecast the average effects of repeal in
states considering repeal.
Unfortunately, since neither the CPS nor the census includes detailed industry or union
information on construction workers, we cannot distinguish definitively between these two
hypotheses.  Indeed, in our supplementary analyses, we found no clear support for either causal
mechanism.   We found no evidence that repeal affected racial wage differentials through the
unionization rate.  The counterfactual of reducing the unionization rate to zero in both
construction and nonconstruction industries would only reduce the magnitude of the raw
difference between blacks’ and nonblacks’ construction wage differential by half.  Compared to
the contribution of unionization to racial wage differentials in the 1960s, the minimal contribution
of unionization in the 1980s and 1990s is striking.  Because law repeal has a relatively small
impact on the unionization rate, law repeal must affect race-based wage differentials primarily
through other means.  
On the other hand, we found no evidence that repeal had different effects on differentsegments of the construction industry.  Differential trends in payroll per worker from the ES202
establishment data presented in Table 2 suggest that repeal affects workers in heavy construction
and light construction equally: the simple DDD estimates of the effect of repeal in the heavy
construction industry are only 0.1 percent greater than the estimates of the effect of repeal in the
light construction industry (-1.9 percent compared to -1.8 percent).  Of course, because the
establishment data do not allow us to control for worker heterogeneity, this finding is not a
definitive rejection of differential impacts across 2-digit SIC construction industries.  We leave
further investigation of the mechanism by which law repeal affects wage schedules to future
research.  One possible avenue for investigation might be the extent to which construction union
behavior or decision-making differs in repeal and nonrepeal states.Table 1:  Chronology of State Prevailing Wage Laws Through 1993
Year Effective Year Effective
State Enactment Repeal State Enactment Repeal
Alabama 1941 1980 Montana 1931
Alaska 1931 Nebraska 1923
Arizona 1912 1979 Nevada 1937
Arkansas 1955 New Hampshire 1941 1985
California 1931 New Jersey 1913
Colorado 1933 1985 New Mexico 1937
Connecticut 1935 New York 1894
Delaware 1962 North Carolina
D.C. 1931 North Dakota
Florida 1933 1979 Ohio 1931
Georgia Oklahoma 1909
Hawaii 1955 Oregon 1959
Idaho 1911 1985 Pennsylvania 1961
Illinois 1931 Rhode Island 1935
Indiana 1935 South Carolina
Iowa South Dakota
Kansas 1891 1987 Tennessee 1953
Kentucky 1940 Texas 1933
Louisiana 1968 1988 Utah 1933 1981
Maine 1933 Vermont
Maryland 1945 Virginia
Massachusetts 1914 Washington 1945
Michigan 1965 West Virginia 1933
Minnesota 1973 Wisconsin 1931
Mississippi Wyoming 1967
Missouri 1957Table 2: Wage Trends in Construction and Nonconstruction Industries,
for States Repealing and Not Repealing Prevailing Wage Laws
Experimental States: States that
Repealed Prevailing Wage Laws
Nonexperimental States: States That

























in  % 
change
(7)
Treatment Group:  Construction Workers  
Census:
    BC Hourly wage 9.654 7.960 -0.175 10.685 9.311 -0.129 -0.047
CPS:
    Hourly wage 8.932 7.302 -0.182 10.098 8.414 -0.167 -0.016
    BC hourly wage 8.717 6.828 -0.217 9.955 7.997 -0.197 -0.020
ES202:
  payroll/employment
     All construction 19266 15981 -0.171 21546 18749 -0.130 -0.041
     Light construction
       (SIC 15 and 17)
18318 15408   -0.159 20657 18229 -0.118 -0.041
     Heavy construction
        (SIC 16)
22642 18632 -0.177 25468 22029 -0.135 -0.042
Control Group:  Nonconstruction Workers
Census:
    BC Hourly wage 7.875 6.838 -0.132 8.442 7.516 -0.110 -0.022
CPS:
    Hourly wage 7.439 7.099 -0.046 8.068 7.679 -0.048 0.003
    BC hourly wage 6.690 5.588 -0.165 7.229 6.087 -0.158 -0.007
ES202:
   
payroll/employment
15799 15432 -0.023 17297 17300 0.000 -0.023
Notes:   ES-202 includes private nonagricultural firms; CPS and census include private-sector nonfarm  wage and salary
workers aged 16 to 64.  For census, 1980 is “before” period; 1990 is “after” period.  For CPS and ES202, 1979 is “before”
period; 1993 is “after” period.  Observations from MN omitted from census analysis because MN enacted a prevailing wage
law in 1973.  Observations from AK, DE, NY, and TX omitted from ES202 analysis because of suppression of 2-digit SIC
construction industry data from those states.  In census, nonconstruction workers are a 1% sample; 1970 construction
workers are a 2% sample; 1990 construction workers are a 5% sample. CPS means calculated using CPS sampling weights.
All dollar amounts in 1982 constant dollars. Table 3: Effects of Prevailing Wage Law Repeal on Blue Collar Wages and the Construction Wage Premium
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Repeal state*after repeal*construction -0.023  -0.039 -0.034  -0.039 -0.002
(0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
Repeal state*after repeal 0.008 -0.001 -0.001  -0.012 -0.015 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal 0.005 0.004
*construction (0.015) (0.014)
Repeal state*long after repeal -0.005  -0.008 
*construction (0.014) (0.015)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal -0.020  -0.021 
(0.009) (0.007)
Repeal state*long after repeal -0.014  -0.010 
(0.007) (0.008)
Demographic controls? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of state*construction interactions? Yes No Yes No Yes  Yes Yes
Data Set census census census CPS CPS CPS CPS
N 1,468,033 1,468,033 1,468,033 1,017,875 1,017,875 1,017,875 1,017,875
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and to within state/year group correlation.  Census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990.  CPS data
from 1977-78 May surveys and 1979-93 MORGs.  See text for full list of demographic and other controls. Relevant models allow returns to demographic characteristics
to differ in 1970, 1980, and 1990 (census) and to differ before and on/after 1986 (CPS).  Columns (2) and (5) control for repeal state*construction.  In column (6),
“shortly after repeal” is 1-2 years, “long after repeal” is 3 or more years; in column (7), “shortly after repeal” is 1-4 years, “long after repeal” is 5 or more years. 
Columns (1)-(3) using census data omit observations from MN because MN enacted a prevailing wage law in 1973.  Observations weighted with sampling weights
described in text.Table 4: Effect of Prevailing Wage Law Repeal on the Construction Wage Premium by Race
Variable




*black (0.019) (0.012) (0.032)
Repeal state*after
repeal*construction
-0.040  -0.040  -0.013
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Repeal state*after repeal*black 0.003 -0.011  -0.036 
(0.030) (0.014) (0.011)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal 0.051 0.037
*construction*black (0.034) (0.031)
Repeal state*long after repeal 0.056 0.068
*construction*black (0.034) (0.036)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal -0.006  -0.006 
*construction (0.016) (0.015)
Repeal state*long after repeal -0.015  -0.020 
*construction (0.015) (0.016)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal -0.040  -0.039 
*black (0.016) (0.013)
Repeal state*long after repeal -0.035  -0.034 
*black (0.012) (0.012)
Full set of state*black interactions?  No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data Set census census CPS CPS CPS
N 1,468,033 1,468,033 1,017,875 1,017,875 1,017,875
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and to within state/year group correlation.  Census data
from 1970, 1980, and 1990.  CPS data from 1977-78 May surveys and 1979-93 MORGs.  See text for full list of demographic
and other controls. Relevant models allow returns to demographic characteristics to differ in 1970, 1980, and 1990 (census)
and to differ before and on/after 1986 (CPS).  Column (1) controls for repeal state*black and repeal state*black*construction;
columns (2)-(5) include controls for state-fixed-effects*black and state-fixed-effects*black*construction. In column (4),
“shortly after repeal” is 1-2 years, “long after repeal” is 3 or more years; in column (5), “shortly after repeal” is 1-4 years,
“long after repeal” is 5 or more years.  Columns (1) and (2) using census data omit observations from MN because MN















Repeal state*after repeal 0.003 -0.001 
*construction (0.016) (0.019)
Repeal state*after repeal*union -0.015 
(0.012)
Repeal state*after repeal 0.019 -0.007 
(0.005) (0.008)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal 0.051 -0.006 
*construction*union member (0.035) (0.030)
Repeal state*long after repeal -0.098  -0.112 
*construction*union member (0.026) (0.028)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal 0.029 0.026 -0.026  -0.012 
*construction (0.028) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019)
Repeal state*long after repeal -0.004  -0.015  0.006 0.007
*construction (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal -0.043  -0.020 
*union (0.026) (0.018)
Repeal state*long after repeal -0.006  -0.011 
*union (0.013) (0.014)
Repeal state*shortly after repeal 0.015 0.013 -0.004  -0.009 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
Repeal state*long after repeal 0.020 0.024 -0.008  -0.006 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
N 754,609 754,609 754,609 754,609 754,609 754,609
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroscedasticity and to within state/year group correlation.  Data from
1977-81 May CPS surveys and 1983-93 CPS MORGs; data on unionization is unavailable in 1982.  All columns control for
state- and time-fixed-effects, state-fixed-effects*construction, time-fixed-effects*construction, and for demographic
characteristics (see text) allowing returns-to-characteristics to differ before and on/after 1986.  Columns (4)-(6) also control
for state-fixed-effects*union member, time-fixed-effects*union, state-fixed-effects*union*construction, and time-fixed-
effects*union*construction. In columns (2) and (5), “shortly after repeal” is 1-2 years, “long after repeal” is 3 or more years;
in columns (3) and (6), “shortly after repeal” is 1-4 years, “long after repeal” is 5 or more years.   Observations weighted
with sampling weights described in text.References
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2.Before 1985, the prevailing wage was equal to that paid to more than 30 percent of the workers
in a given industry/occupation/area group, or the average if less than 30 percent of the workers
earned the same amount.
3.In this and all of our subsequent analysis, we deleted individuals reporting wages of less than
$1.65 or greater than $50 per hour in 1982 constant dollars.
4.We assume in all of the models that law repeals take effect beginning in the calendar year after
the repeal is adopted.
5.We estimate all models allowing for heteroscedasticity and for within state/time-group
correlation in åist, which may be important in models of state policy effects (Moulton 1990).
6.Prior to 1989, workers in the CPS earning more than $999 per week were topcoded at $999. 







7.If the unadjusted CPS sampling weight for individual i in state s during year t is defined as  Ùist
(e.g., the number of individuals represented by individual i), analyses of the May/MORG sample
weight each observation by its adjusted sampling weight ù ist, where
8.The impact of repeal on the change over time in the census in wage growth rates (e.g., 1980-90
wage growth relative to 1970-80 wage growth in repealing versus nonrepealing states) is small
and statistically insignificant, suggesting some caution in a strong causal interpretation of our
Endnotesfindings; state repeals may be correlated with preexisting factors affect construction labor
markets.  
9.Calculations based on the 1990 census.
10.Interpretation of the long-run rather than the short-run effects as the equilibrium impact of law
report depends on two key assumptions: 1) that the full effects of repeal on labor markets take
more than two years to appear and 2) no other changes in the labor market or legal environment
correlated with but not caused by repeal occurred three to five years after repeal.  On one hand, to
the extent that wage levels, and especially wages differences across types of workers, take several
years to re-equilibrate in response to changes in state policy, the long-run effects would accurate
represent the equilibrium impact of law reform.  On the other hand, to the extent that union
contracts in the construction industry are shorter than two years in duration, the short-run effects
would accurately represent the equilibrium impact of repeal, with fewer potential unobserved
confounding factors.
11. The minimal contribution of the unionization rate to racial wage differentials in construction in
the 1980s and 1990s is particularly striking when compared either to its contribution in 1967, or
to the total racial wage differential.  According to Ashenfelter (1972), the estimated contribution
of unionization to racial differences in construction wage premiums was 8.9 percentage points in
1967.  According to calculations based on the 1990 census, the total racial wage differential in the
construction industry was 17.6 percent.
12.This would be true if, for example, (prevailing-wage-law covered) state and local construction
projects involve more heavy than light construction, and light construction workers are poor
substitutes for heavy construction workers.